Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Bliss S. Elmer v. A. H. Mortensen, Dba A. H.
Mortensen Plumbing & Heating Company :
Respondent's Brief On Appeal

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Thomas, Armstrong, Rawlings, West & Schaerrer; Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Elmer v. Mortensen, No. 10915 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4314

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BLISS S. EUMER,

Plaintiff Dlnd Respondent,

-vs.A. H. MORTENSEN, d/b/a
A. H. MORTENSEN PLUMBING
& HEATING COMPANY,
Def~

Case
No.10915

am.d AppeUMIJ.

Respondent's Brief on Appeal
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court
of Utah County, Utah
THE HoNoBABLE .ALLEN B. SoRENBEN, Judge

THOMAS, ARMSTRONG,
RAWLINGS, WEST
& SCHAERRER

1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent

STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

F I LED

Attorneys for D0fendant-Appellarn.t

O': T2 - 1967

.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE.......................................

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT..................................................

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL............ ...........................................

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................

2

ARGUMENT .............................................. --·-·····-······················-············
6
POINT I:
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN THE
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY..........................

6

POINT II:
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN SEPARATING THE
LOSS OF EARNING FROM THE OTHER GENERAL
AND SPECIAL DAMAGES, NOR IS THERE ANY
SPECIAL DAMAGES, NOR IS THERE ANY DUPLICATION IN THE JURY'S AWARD.........................................

12

A. DEFENDANT HAS NO STANDING TO ATTACK THE FORM OF THE VERDICT WHERE
HE FAILED TO MAKE TIMELY OBJECTIONS
THERETO .................................................................... ... .. . 13
B. THERE WAS

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
THE FORM OF VERDICT, AND IT IS IMMATERIAL WHETHER LOSS OF EARNINGS IS
AN ITEM OF GENERAL OR SPECIAL DAMAnES ........................................................................................

16

POINT III:
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN FAILING TO STATE A
FORMULA TO REDUCE FUTURE DAMAGES TO
PRESENT WORTH .................... . ....................................... ....

22

CONCLUSION

23
Authorities Cited

Atchison v. Lee. 8 Kansas 24, 54 Pac. 4. ...

20

Baker v. Cook. 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 264..

Ill

Brunson v. Strong. 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451.
Bryant v Stringham Stage Line,

61)

Utah 299, 208 Pac. fi41

Cluvos \. Home Life Insurance Company of N1,w York.
8::J Utah 401. 28 P 2d 607...

9
12

20

Ferguson \ _ .Jong~ma. IO Utah 2d 179, 350 P.2d 404

H

Hale~\' Petnson. 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 882

!I

TABLE OF CONTENTS -

(Continued)
Page

Hamilton v. Union Oil Company, 216 Oregon 354,
339 P.2d 440 ................................................................................... .

9
Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564............ . ... .... 17

Hays v. New York Central Railroad Company,
328 Ill. Appeals 631, 67 N.E.2d 215................. ...................

22

Heywood v. D. & R. G. Railroad Company, 6 Utah 2d 155,
307 P.2d 1045........................................................................ .. .

9

Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186.......................

14

Jorgenson v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330. 383 P.2d 934.......

13

McKinley v. Wagner, 67 Idaho 104, 170 P.2d 796........... .... ..... . .
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273....................... .

.....

21

......... .

19

Reed v. Simpson, 32 Calif. 2d 444, 196 P.2d 888 ..
Rhemke v. Clinton, 2 Utah 230........................................... ..

9
9

Solitz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 11, 395 P.2d 25.....
Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P.2d 575.........

12
9

Wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P.2d 485.................

12

Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Nelson,
11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81......................................................

21

Wentz v. T. E. Connally, Inc., 45 Wash. 2d 127,
273 P.2d 485 ................................................................................ ....... 23
53 Am. Jur., TriaL..........................................................................
88 C.J.S. Trial, Section 393............................................................ ..... .

17
8

89 C.J.S. Trial, Section 525 .........................................................

15

Rule 47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.........................................

13

Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure................................................ 17
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure..................................... .

19

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BLISS S.

EL~fER,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-\'S.-

A. IL l\IORTENSEN, cl/h/a
A. H. l\[ORTENSI~N PLUMBING
& HEATING COJ\IP ANY,

Case

No.10915

Defenr/a.nt and Appellant.

Respondent's Brief on Appeal

STATE~£ENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

As was stated by appellant, this is an action for
personal injuries suffered by plaintiff resulting from
the nci.digence of defendant's employee at a construction
~i1e i11 Spri11gTille, Utah on April 3, 1964.

DISPOSITION IX THE LOWER COURT
Tht' ease was tried to a jury in the District Court
!' Ftah County, and resulted in a Yerdict in favor of
t l1P pla i111 iff i11 the amount of $45,000.00.
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RELIEF SOFGH'l' ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks that the jury verdict and judgmr•ii\
on the verdict be affirmed.
STATE,'\lENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff agrees substantially with the statement
of facts as set forth in appellant's brief, but wishes to
add the following:
On the day of the accident, plain tiff ,,·as working
with a crew of men pouriug portions of th<> eoncretP
slab floor on the construction project. Dcfeudant and
his employees were i11 another area ()f the 1milcling doing
plumbing work. The cernrnt pour on the clay of the
accident had been completecl, and )ilarion Elmer, plaintiff's brother, was instructed to get the wire mesh reauy
for the next pour which was to be the following U.ay
(T-30). This necessitated cutting 32-foot strips from
the heavy rolls of wire mesh. As indicated in appellant's
brief, this was done inside the building in the area near
the entrance, and the wire mesh was placed in layers
on top of each other as they were cut. There were four
lengths of wire cut and stacked on top of each other
at the time of the accident.
Appellant states in his brief tliat plaintiff admitted
that the wire could have been rolled out in another area.
However, the record shows that the rolls weighed 250
lbs. and could not be easily moved by the man doing the
cutting; that it was easier to do the work near the driwway because of the terrain: that no trucks were being

1
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<'xpecte<l to use the driveway that afternoon, and that

the entire operation of cutting wire would take only
npproximately one-half hour; and that even with the
win• laid out, there was ample room for trucks to pass
( rr-:J9, 90, 91, 121, 122).
Defendant's truck was located inside the building,
awl apparently it became necessary for him to send one
of the rmployees back to the shop for a plumbing part.
,\s the trurk approached the driveway area where the
"·in• \ms stacked, plaintiff stood on the wire and held
the ronwr down with a two-by-four. The purpose of
tloillg this was to provide a marker for the driver to
watch so he could avoid hitting the wire (T-102); also
to hold the "·ire down so it woul<ln 't get caught by the
trnek in the t>vent the truck got too close (T-116). Plaintiff tl1e11 directed the driver who had stopped to "come
oYPr it slow''.
At this point, the driver completely ignored the
din·ctiuns giYen him and re\'Ved his motor and accelerate-cl. One eye witness described what happened as
follows:

"Then it was fast. Before the truck moved, the
wheels started to move and throw gravel. And
then he revved the motor. The next thing I heard
is Bliss holler, and as I looked at him, he was in
the air higher than I could reach, and then he
landed out here and ·was dragged with the wire
hefore the truck stopped." (T-123)
The drin•r of the defendant's truck, after revvmg
l1i:-; e11g-i11e, and spinning his wheels, drove onto the wire
nt a completely unreasonable speed, hooking the wire
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and travelling a total distance of approximately three
or four car lengths before stopping (T-47, 48, 124, 126,
128). The plaintiff described the driving of the truck
as follows: "vVell, he speeded it up, awl in that grawl
it spun the wheels, and he shot out of there likl' he wa,,
going to a fire." ( T-39) The plaintiff had his foet
jerked out from underneath him (T-282), had two rolls
of wire wadded over him, and was dragged outside the
building ( T-124). The def enclant 's fon•man, Clyde 1\Iortensen, testified that he probably told the driver of the
truck to hurry as he left to get the part that '""~
needed by the plumbers (T-278). The foreman, ClyclP
Mortensen, further testified that he ohsened the trmk
leave the building, that it was loaded heavily with plumbing equipment, and observed the hack of the truek bounce
and settle at least 10 inc hes ( T-281). He observed the
truck bounce in this manner from his iiosition in the
northwest corner of the building about 100 feet away
and sa\v the plaintiff's feet jerk out from underneath
him and ran to the scene yelling at the truck clrinr.
''Don't you know you han' a man on the back of this '
truck?" ( T-282, 284)
Appellant states in his brief that plaintiff aclmit1rd
that he could have gotten a larger stick to hold the wire
down, and therefore not have been required to stand 011
the wire at all. The evidence shows that he stoo(l on
the wire in order to hold both corners down, and that
there were not any longer sticks in the immediate area
(T-105, 106). The plaintiff, l\Ir. Elmer, did not lieliP\'C'
it to be reasonably necessary to go to great lengths to
take any further precautions ('11 -U3) obviously because
4

,

hacl the driver clone as directed and driven slow, there
\l'onlcl have bee11 no reason to anticipate any danger,
c\'l'll if t lie truck were to catch the wire.
Respondent agT('eS fully with appellant's statement
of fads relating to damages iu that plaintiff suffered
,~Prions injuries to his hack requiring lumbro-sacral
fusions. He is 58 yearn of age and has received a 30%
loss of body function. The injuries are permanent.
Actually four vertebrae were fused together heginuing with L-3 to the sacrum, which means a total fusion
nrnl soli(] backbone from the plaintiff's waist to his
sacrum (T-158). The orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Charles
Rmitl1, .Jr., testified that a handful and a-half of bone
r·hips were taken from the plaintiff's hip in order to
fnst• these several vrrtebrae together in an operation
that rcquire(l five hours (T-158-160). The successful
fusion of the n rtehrae results in total loss of movement
in that part of the spine that is fused and eliminates
11rrn• root irritation ancl pai11 (T-159). Unfortunately
tlit> plaintiff did not obtain a satisfactory or successful
fusion in all areas. The attempted fusion between L-3
and L-4 nrtebrae resulted in a failure of fusion or
contimwcl monment (T-166, 167). The result of the
fusion failure leans the same symptoms that necessitated tlw plaintiff to submit to surgery originally,
name!~·, 11cn·e root irritation, the continuation of pain,
nml a loss of function ( T-167). The result of the failure
to fusp left tlH' plaintiff with pseudarthrosis, a false
j1Ji11t or an incomplete fusion (T-172). For this reason
th<· plaintiff was given a whole body permanent <lisahilit~, rating of thirty (30%) percent and the doctor has
1
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lll'V<:>r

he0n able to release the plaintiff to return to

earpL•ntry work (T-179).

Dr. Smith further testified

that ht> ditl not Sl'l' how the plaintiff coulcl l'SCape the
l'Yl'11hmlity of having future acMitio11al surg-ery to eor.

rect the incomplete fusion (T-173). He estimated futurl'
nwdical and hospital 0xpenses to he approximatrh
$~,000.00, with a future work loss of approximately ~ix
mouths (T-176).
Prior to the aeeident his rneome as a carpenkr wa~
$7,000.00 iwr year.

Because of his permanent injury,

he eannot do carpentry work in tl1e future. He has tried
to seek other employment, and no\\· earns $-1.800.00 p0r

yt•ar, which is the hig-hest paid job a\·ailahle to him. His
loss of t'arnings to the date of the· trial wa:' $10,530.00.
\[t>dieal expenses prior to trial \\·ere ~~.-ri:L>O.

~.\.RGF~IEXT

POIXT I
THERE "\\ ~.\.S XO PRE.TrDIC'L.\.L ERROR
lN THE corRT'S IXSTRrCTIOXS TO
THE .TrRY .
. \pp1.'llant in his hri1.'f has citl'd mmwrous l·asPs, all
l'l'l'itin~ and nplwlding- th1.' g"l'IH'r<ll pri1ll:·ipl1.' that it iR

t'l"J"t)J" for tlw trial court h) i11st nwt a jury in ..:11ch a

nrnn111.'r as tt) dt'prin' a party l)f his tl11c't)ry lir' thl' en~c
if said tht'tll')" is supptnh'd !)y tht• t'\-ith>i:,·t>. Pl<1i11tiff
and l"l'Sjhllldt'll( takt'S 1)() l'Xl't'ptitlll Tl) :L:..: :.'."-'!lt'!';I! pri11(0iplt'. t'I" !t) tht' ht)ldin~s ,)t' an;- t)t' th' ,·;1,..L'S t·it1•d 111
t'tllll\St'l. Tht'St' ,·;!St's dt' 11,)t i:1,-,);,-l. r'ad ,:::;:1~i 1 )1l' f'\l'll

remote]>· similar to the instant case. None of them are
npplirnhle here; 11or was c1efenclm1t deprived of his
t!Jenn· of the case.
Defrndant 's specific objection goes to Instruction
~ o. 1l "·herein he claims said instruction "restricts
defendant to two grounds of contributory negligence
and i11 effect tells the jury that the standing on the wir0
11hile th(• truck was driven over it, as a matter of law,
11·ould not be suffici0nt evidence from which the jury
r·onlc1 find that thr plaintiff was contributorily negligent.'' f.;uch an implication simply cannot be read into
this instruction. Under Instruction No. 11, the jury
1rnf' pt•rmittc>d to consider the issues of contributory
nrgligP1we in any of the following:
'' (a)

In that he failed to remove the reinforcing
wire from the entrance of the building before allowing the truck driven by Douglas
Dwaine Paulson to proceed.

(h)

In that he failed to maintain a proper lookout and exercise reasonable due care for
his own safety.''

l'a ragra ph ( h) a hon• does not restrict in any sens<', hut
on the contra r~· is a broad instruction permitting tht>
in tf frct to eonsider any reasonablr theory supportl'tl h~· tlw c·,·i<lr11ee. Thrre is absolutely nothing in
thif' lnngnagp \\·hieh says or even implies that thf' jury

inr~

('()Hld not as a matter of law find contributory ncgligPll<'P
fr11m tlie plaintiff's standing Oil the wire while th0 tru<'k
11:1.~ dri1·en on•r it.

:11

ll!'f1·nda1tt in liis reqtwHt for i1tHfnwtionH did not
<lll\ 1 im" rr•<Jllf'st any i1tstrndio11H specifi<'ally Hdting-
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forth standing on the wire as a specific ground for con.
t ributory negligence. Had he done so, it is \'Cry likely
that the trial court would have given such au instruction.
Defendant's Requested Instructions No. 11 and 12 ask
only that contributory negligence he considered in hroai]
terms. Having requested the jury b0 instructed in broa<l
terms, and never having requested that the eonrt in.
struct on any specific theory, it would s0em that defendant is in no position to complain because> the court wa:not more specific in its instructions. So far as plailltiff
has been alile to determine, it is m1in'rsa1ly lwld by all
courts that if instructions are correct as far as they go,
hut are deficient because of their generality or failure
to reach all points of the case, a party desiri11g add[.
tional instructions must make a request therefore (88
C.J.S. Trial, Section 393).
In the case of Ferguson v. .Jongsma, 10 Utah ~d 119,
350 P.2d 404, a defendant contended that it was error
to submit the issue of reckless disregard hy defendant
for plaintiff's safety without also submitting the issue
in defense of plaintiff's disregard for his own safety.
There was no request made for submission of the latter
issue. In rejecting the contention, the court stated as
follows:
''Plaintiff in proposing an instruction on his
theory of the case is not required to also propose
instructions setting out all the possible defenses
thereto. If defendant's desired instructions on
defense to any ground which would allow })lai11tiff to recover, he should propose them."

8

Sec also JlcKi11ley v. Wagner, 67 Idaho 104, 170 P.2d
/0fi: llr1111i1frm \', Un inn Oil Cmnpany, 216 Oregon 354,

P.2c1 4-40; Reed v. Simpsnn, 32 Calif. 2d 444, 196 P.2d
888: nll holding that if a clefernlant desires an instruction
on his theor~' of thr case, he has a duty to so request
the ('<mrt.
;;;)~l

'l1 he Utah Supreme Court has held time and time
ai.rain that instructions must he considered altogether
nncl Yil'\\'rll with tolerance and understanding to see
whctl1cr the hasic issues were fairly and intelligently
prrsr11h•tl for determ!nation, and if that purpose is accomplishe(l, that is all that is necessary, and no verdict
-:honld ll0 nullified for minor errors or inconsistencies
i11 t hr instructions. H C''!JH'Ond v. D. & R. G. Railroad
ru111 pally, 6 Utah 2d 155, :107 P.2d 1045. One instruction
~110111<1 not he considered in isolation in order to predi<"atc' a claim of error upon it, hut the instructions must
lie read nrnl urnJerstoocl as a connected whole. Taylor v.
J11l111so11. 18 Utah 2cl 16, 414 P.2d 575. The issues should
lw presrnted in a fair and understandable manner with
the least possihlr instructions. Hales Y. Peterson, 11
Utah 2d 411, ~60 P.2d 882. Instructions should be considered as a whole and in relation to facts shown by evide11cr. Rn111sn11 "· Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451.
·with the ahove rules in mind, let us examine the
whole of the instructions in the instant case. The court
in its Instruction No. 2 set out in detail defendant's
daims of contributory negligence, including the claim
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent "in failing
to <'X Prci St' d nr ('H re for his own safety, in that he stood
9

on the wire while the truck passed over it." \Vhik· it i~
true that Instruction No. 3, a stock instruction, ad\·ises
the jury that the claims of the parties as set forth iii
Instruction No. 2 are 11ot to he co11sidered as ;1 st:1h·n1r·nt
upon the part of the court as to what the fads arc.,
there is absolutely nothing anywhere in the instructi 0118
to tell or imply to the jury that they cannot consiuer any
of the contentions as so set forth; Instrurtion No. ~
must further be considNf'd with Instruction No. l which
explains to the jury that it is their exclusive proYinet•
to determine thL' facts i11 the case, arnl to eonsidPr a1111
weigh the evi<lencC' for that pnrpoS('. Inst met ion No. fi
properly defined contributory nC'gligencP. Instruetion
No. 11 instructed the jury that plaintiff wonlc1 hr precluded from recovery if thr jury were to find contributory negligence in any of the particulars therrin set out,
including the broad grounds of lookout and failurr to
rxercise due care.
Defendant has made further attack on Instruction
No. 11 because paragraph (b) therein defines as a
ground of eontributory negligenee the failnn' to maiutain a proper lookout ''and'' exercise dm' care for
plaintiff's o-wn safety; defendant says that the eonrt
should have used the word "or" rather than "arnl." In
this case, the claim of improper lookout is tied dirrdl;·
to the specific act of being on tlw wire. In othPr \\-ords,
defendant claims that plaintiff should luffe maintaine<l
a proper lookout to reasonably ohsC'rYe that the trn<'k
was coming and thereby get off the wire. So far a~
respondent is aware, th(•rc \\'as no otl1er claim rnadr
for improper lookout.
10

"\ 11 ad(litional instruction on contributory negliV"'li('P was giv(rn in Instruction No. 12.
Instruction No.
!:2 pro\·idt>s that "it was the duty of the plaintiff, Bliss
S. }<~!mer, to use reasonable care under the circumstances
to pn•pnre the driveway so that the truck could proceed
across it pursuant to his instructions and to maintain a
pn1p('l' lookout for the safety of himself and others as
!l1L· t rurk thus procPe<le<l. The failure of the plaintiff
tl111s to f'omlnct himself in accordance \\'ith any of the
fon•going requirements of law would constitute contributory ncgligenre on his part." Under Instruction No.
12 it sPems clear that if the plaintiff failed to so preparP th<> driveway so that the truck could not pass over
it without eausing injury to himself, then the injury
cans0d by standing on the wire would be attributable to
plaintiff's contributory negligence. It is thus apparent
that "'hf'n all of the instructions are considered as a
"·hole, tlH• iss1ws were in fact fairly and intelligibly presented to the jury.
En11 if it \\·0re to be assumed that the defendant
\\·;is deprive(l of the jury considering his theory of the
~ta11di11g on the wire as an issue of contributory negli~r·JH'r• (which the instructions when considered as a
\1-holP clearly shO\\' he was not), it is difficult to see how
<111:-· pr(•judice conld r0sult. In reaching its verdict, the
jmy llP('l'Ssarily was required to find by a preponderance of L'Videncr that the defendant's agent was neglig\•nt in racing the truck across the wire. The evidence
is undisputed that tlw driver was specifically told to
dri\-(• slow. Thr plaintiff had no legal duty whatsoever
1,, a11tic·ipatr' any smldf'n outbreak of negligence on the
11

part of the driver. See Solitz v. Am111er111a11, 1G Utah 2d
11, 395 P.2d 25; Bryant v. Stringham Stage Line, GU
Utah 299, 208 Pac. 541. Had the driver done as directed
'
there is nothing in the record to show how the plaintiff
could possibly have been injured, even if the trnek caught
the wire. The evid0nce could not support a finding of
contributory negligence for standing on the wire or a
finding that such action on the part of the plai11tiff could
have been a proximate cause of the injury. Plaintiff has
cited no cases whatsoever which under these cireumt>tances would support the view that such a finding could
be made.
This court has stated that a venlict will 11ot lie
overturned in the absence of a showing of error \Yhich
is prejudicial in the sense that in its absence there is a
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a contrary result. Wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 35D, 423
P. 2d 485. In the case at bar, defendant had a fair trial
in every respect. Defendant presented the issues raised
on this appeal to the trial court on a motion for new
trial. The judge who tried the case found 110 merit i11 his
contentions and denied the motion. This court should
likewise affirm the verdict.

POINT II
THERE \VAS NO ERROR IN 8E~PA1L\TI~G
THE LOSS OF EARNING FR();\[ 'rirn
OTHER GENERAL .AND 8PJ1~CIAL D,Ul
AGES, NOR IS THF~RE ANT DUPLH',\Tlll~
IN THE JURY'S A \VARD.
12

A. TJcf c11dant has no standing to attack the form of
the verdict where he failed to make timely objectirms thereto.
Defendant complains on appeal because the trial
court submitted a verdict form to the jury wherein the
jur)· was asked by the trial court to make separate
as:-<c>ssments for geueral damages, special damages and
lu:-<s of <><nnings. Defendant uow claims that the form
d n•rdirt was improper because it permitted a separate
finding for loss of Parnings, when such should have been
i11elrnkd eitl1rr as part of the general or special damau:es. Y rt at no time during the trial did defendant
mah a11y objection to the form of the verdict; nor did
l1r ol)jed to the damage instructions of the court on the
gT01111!1 that the i11struetions would permit a duplication
of r1amages.
Rn le .J. 7 ( r) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides :
'· lf the ,-en1ict rendered is informal or insufficient, it
mn~- ]Jp corn•ete<1 by the jury under the ackice of the
\'OU rt, or the jury may be sent out again."
In interprciting this rule, the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Jorgenson v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 383 P.2d 934,
~tated as follows:
''The general and well established rule is that so
long as the jury is functioning as such in the
rourse of the trial and until it is discharged, it
is subject to directions and instructions from the
court to the end that the issues be fully tried, delihera ted upon and a correct verdict rendered.
:\ml where it is apparent that there is some patl'llt error in r01mection with the verdict, the court
may, of course, call the matter to their attention
13

and direct them to redeliberate. In that regard it
has been held, sensibly and properly, that- where
an amount is erroneously included, the court may
direct the jury to retire and correct it.''
·

It would seem that if there was any question on the
part of the defendant as to the form, or the proper
amount of the jury verdict, or any qu0stion of duplication, counsel could and should have requestel1 an~·
such matter to be clarified under proper directions and
instructions from the court before the jury was discharged. HaYing made no such request, and having sat
back and permitted the court to discharge the jury after
three days of trial, defendant is not now in a position
to raise any objection.
In the case of Hul v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, :3i7
P.2d 186, a party litigant claimed preju<licial error b0cause insurance was mentioned during the trial. No objection had been made by either party in the trial court.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Crockett,
the court stated as follows:
"But there is an insuperable difficulty with the
plaintiff's position. His counsel let the incident
pass without objection and without a request to
rectify any harm he thought had been done. Fair
play and good conscience require that he do so at
the earliest opportunity. Tt "-ould be manifflst1~·
unjust for a party to sit silently by, belieYing that
prejudicial error had been committed, proceed
with the trial to its completion, and allow the jury
to deliberate and reach a verdict, to see if he wins,
then if he loses, come forward with a claim that
such an error rendered the verdict a nullity. If
this could he dorn•, proceedings after such an oc14

currence would be in vain and thus an imposition
npon the court, the jury an<l all concerned. The
court will not countenance any such mockery of its
proc<:>edings. If something occurs which the party
thinks is wrong and so prejudicial to him that he
thereafter cannot have a fair trial, he must make
his objection promptly and seek redress by moving for a mistrial, or by having cautionary instructions given, if that is deemed adequate, or be
held to waive whatever rights may have existed
to do so.''
The above principle has been held to apply to
claimed errors at any stage of the proceedings, and partieularly to claimed defects in a jury verdict as is defendant's claim here. This basic principle is set forth
at 8!1 C ..J.S. 'frial, Section 525, as follows:
"An error or defect in the form of a verdict is
waived by the failure to make timely objections.
Objection to irregularity or informality in a verdict must be taken at its rendition or time of return, at the term at which the verdict is rendered,
and before the jury are discharged, otherwise
the objection will be deemed to have been
waived."
In the case of Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d
264, a defendant neither objected nor excepted to the
forms of questions submitted in a special verdict. On
appeal it was held that he could not later raise this as an
isRue and claim that the questions in the verdict were
drawn so as to confuse the jury.
Based on the above principles of law, the record in
this case clearly shows that defendant has waived any
objection to the form of verdict.
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B. There

'Was 1rn prejudicial error i11 flte form "f

rerdict, and it is immatrrial 1!'lwtl1er loss of ean 1_
ings is a11 item of gc11eral or s;;r·cial rlamaqes.

Defendant iu his brief has cik<l many easp:;; in ;i 11
attempt to defille \\·hcther damagPs for los:;; of earnings
are general or :;;pecial damages. Thesr cases <kal primarily \\·ith thP fJlll'stion of plrading, and are not material here. In the cases cited by counsel, tlw disti11ctio 11
becomes important umfor ru]ps of procedure thnt n'qnire items of special damages or 1wrmaue11cp of i11
juries to lw speeifically plea<1P<1. As properly stated r,t
page 30 of appellant's brief, the purpose of l'l'qnirinl:'
such pleading is to gi,·e notice to the <1rfr11<lant of thP
nature and exte11t of the claim so that ht' mig-111 pl'OJH:rly
prepare his defollse arnl not be taken hy snrprisr.
In the instant case, there is no claim of impropr·r
pleading, 11or of an~- surprise 011 the part of cldPwlm1t.
Plaintiff's amellcled complaint alleges that lie has s11ffrn'<l lost \\·ages and will colltinue to suff<•r loss of incomt>; the deposition of plaintiff which was tnkr 11 hY
defelldant prior to trial mid published at the time of trial
leaYes no clouht as to the nature of plaintiff's dairn:":
r,nd the pre-trial order specifically states that "it is 1111clerstoocl that plaintiff will preseut kstimo11:· eo11ecrn
ing future loss of wages.''
1

In anal~·zing the Utah cases t1Pali11g "·itli t]J(' <kfii1ition of ge11ernl and s1weial damages, it is ;1ppan'11t. fl'
appellant has pointed out, that there has hee11 som<' confusion as to 'd1dl1er loss of <·arni11gs is L(<'lll'ral or spt'cial clamag-P. Becanse of this m1c·Prtai11t~, it l1as been
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t!H· prncl iee of many trial courts throughout the state to

ln1n• the jury consider loss of earnings as an item separate arnl apart from the other elements of damage. This
is what was done in the instant case. Certainly it can1101 he contended that loss of earnings, both past and
fntme, if shown with reasonable certainty, is not a proper e10mcnt of damages in an action for personal injuries.
RPganllcss of whether loss of earnings are general
or "Jl<'('ial damage, it woukl not be improper for the trial
court to rrqnest the jury to make a separate finding on
this qnrstion as was done here. This would merely have
the 0ifoct of being a special verdict which is proper under Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 49( a)
speeifieall)· pro,·i<les that the trial court "may use such
mdho<l of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate." The
hrni!11Hge of this rule clearly gives wide discretion to the
trial eourt in determining the form of verdict. In the
easr of Tl auks v. rhriste11se11, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564,
t11is eonrt has stated that "it is clf'mentary that there is
no impropriety in submitting special interrogatories if
the eourt so desires.''

Enn if it wNe to he assumed that it is error for the
trial eonrt to prrmit a separate finding by the jury for
loRs of earnings, it could not possibly be prejudicial. The
fo110\Ying sections from 53 Am. Jnr., Trial, set forth the
g-Pneral law in this regard:
Section 1035. ''The responsibility of returning a trne verdict rests with the jury, and it is a
matter of accommodation, and not a legal require-
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ment, that the trial judge suppl~T the jur~T with the
proper forms in any given case. Any words which
convey the meaning and intention of the jury are
usually deemed to be sufficient. So long as the
verdict manifests the intention and findings of thr
jury upon the issues suhmitt0d to them, it will
not be overthrown because of defects of form
merely. Certainly irregularities in the form of a
verdict which do not affect the merits of the controversy constitute no ground for the reversal of
th0 judgment based upon the verdict.''
Section 1036. ''Because inartificial e>xprPRsions and words are sometimes employed in framing a verdict, the first object in the construction
of a verdict is to learn th0 intrnt of the jury, and
when this can be asrertain0d, surh 0ffect shonld
be given to the verdirt, consistrnt with l0gal principles and ronstruing it as a who10, as will most
nearly ronform to the intent. The jury's intent is
to be arriv0d at by regarding the v0rdict liberally,
with all reasonable intendments in its support
and with the sol0 view of asrertaining the menning of tlw jury, and not under the trrhniral rules
of construction which are applicable to pleadings.
In the interpretation of an ambiguous verdict, the
nourt may make use of anything in th0 prorredings that serves to show with certainty what the
jur~T intended, and for this purpose, referenre
may he had, for example, to the pleadings, the
evidence, the admissions of the parties, th0 instructions, or thP forms of v0rdirt submitted."
Sertion 10;'50. "Although defrrtin' in form, if
a verdict substantia11y finds the qu0stio11 in issue
in such a wa~' as "-ill enable tlw rourt intelligent]>'
to pronou_nre judgm0nt th0reon for one or the
other party, acrording to tlw manifest intention
of the jury it is suffieirntly rertain. As is the casr
generally, every reasona bl0 e011struction should
18

be adopted for the purpose of working the verdict into form so as to make it serve. Further, if,
by reference to the record, any uncertainty in the
verdict can he explained, it is sufficient to sustain
the appropriate judgment."
If the above principles are applied to the instant case,
the jury verdict must stand. It is only in the case of uncertainty, or in the case of the jury considering an improper item of damages, that prejudice could possibly
result. As to the former, the itemizing of loss of earnings eliminates any uncertainty in that it shows how the
.inry arrived at the total verdict; as to the latter it has
been shown that loss of earnings, both past and future,
11re proper items of damages.

Rule 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals with
the question of harmless error and provides as follows:
''No error or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is grounds for granting a new
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disreg-ard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."
The harmless error rule has been applied to many jury
,·rrdicts by the Utah Supreme Court. In the case of
Rhemkc v. Clinton, 2 Utah 230, a verdict of $40,219.26
was returned by a jury. The jury verdict was questioned as it contained a large award for interest and the
rcnlirt was also itemized. The court admitted that the
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question of interest was a question of law aml not fact,
but considered the including of interest in the jury verdict as harmless C'fror and stated ''This question as to
the verdict is one not of substance hut of mere form.
Under our system of pleading when substantial jnstiep i:-;
done, the mere form should not defeat it.''
rrhe same result ·was reached in the case of A frli iso11
v. Lee, 8 Kansas 24, 54 Pac. 4. The jury venlict a1)peared to contain a double award for pain arnl snff Pri11!~.
Damages were awarded for pain and suffering, and a]"o
awarded for mental sufferillg and (listress aml w1•rc•
itemized. Defense counsel in the case arg1wcl that thcrr
was a duplication of awarcls. The court held as follow,;:
"The two items will be treated as <'quin1lent to a
single allowance for mental and physical pain arn1
suffering where the same is supported h~- the e,-j_
clenre as it was evident that tlw ,iur~- internle(1 to
allow an award for pain and suffering, both ph~·si
ral and mental.''
'I'hougb the damages wer0 awarded
no prejudicial error.

separntel~-,

then•

\\"<Iii

In the cas0 of Clovos v. Home Life l11s11ranre ('0111pany of New Yark, 83 Utah 401, 28 P.2d 607, the jury
awarded a verdict by assessing the plaintiff's damage in
the sum of $20.00 per month commencing with Sept<•mber 15, 1930, and the jur~· did not state> \\"he>n the the c·ompemmtiou should end. The allegation \YnS mack that thP
verdict was ambiguous and therefore prejmlicial and 111•fective. The court hcM that it was harmless error awl
stated that the eourt could look at tlw p11tire record ~rnd
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plNHli11gs and from these a judgment on the verdict
should be mitered for a fixed amount.
The argument of defendant in this case that there is a
clnplication in the award is absurd. The jury found
$;~)0,000.00 losR of earnings and $12,500.00 in other genend damages. If the general damage figure was meant
to inclnde the loss of earnings, the award for general
damagc>s could llot have been $12,500.00, hut would have
had to 0xceecl $::l0,000.00. The instructions given to the
jm;· properly outlined all of the elements of damage
l'or "·liich they could permit recovery. It must be assmn<'cl that the jury ro11sistecl of intelligent individuals
and that the>)' followed the instructions of the court. In
t!JP ease of JVebcr Basin Water Consen·ancy District v.
Xl'!so11, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81, this court stated that
presumptions and intendments cannot be indulged in to
(·stablish a contradiction or inconsistency in the findings or anS\Yers of a jury to special interrogatories, the
pni.snmption always being to the contrary. The Rame
pr<',.;umption must be given to the ,·erdict reached by the
jury in the present case. In the case of Pace v. Parrish,
122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, it was again stated that
wl1<>nen'r thNe is uncertainty or doubt in connection
with the correlation of interrogatories with each other
and their answers, they should he so interpreted as to
harmonize with the findings of the jury if that can be
clcnw.
The awanl of $30,000.00 for loss of earnmgs likell'is(· was not unreasonable in light of the evidence. The
co1irt in its damage instruction instructed the jury on
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past and future loss of earnings in the same paragraph,
so naturally the jury consider0d these i terns together.
The evi<l0nce established $10,475.00 in past loss of earnings, and the balance of $19,525.00 would constitute fuhue loss of earnings. This amount is nominal in light of
plaintiff's proven loss of earning capacity, his fixed hodily disability, his inability to return to his former type
of employment, and his life exp0ctancy. Ther0 is no rrason or justification whatsoever to interfere with tlw
verdict of the jury.

POINT III
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN FA !LING TO
STATE A FORl\fULA TO REDUCE FUTURE
DAMAGES TO PRESENT WORTH.
Defendant claims error because the court failed to
give .JIFU instructions No. !10.34 and 90.3;) relating to
a reductinn of future damages hecause of a present payment in cash. Again th0 difficult~- with defendant's position is that he did not request these instructions to hr
given.
Defendant has cited two cases in support of his contention, neither of which is in point. In the case of llatjs
v. New York Central Railroad Compa11y, 328 Tll. Appeals 631, 67 N.E.2d 215, thr court granted a nrw trial
on entirely different grounds. In doing so, the court
commented on several of the jury instructions, among
which was an instruction relating to the J)l'es0nt valnr of
future loss, stating that the court shonlcl ha»e givrn 11
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formula whPl'eby the jury could make the computation.
The case was not reversed on this ground and the court
did not say that this error was prejudicial. The question of waiver because of no request for an appropriate
instruction was not even in issue.
The case of ·wentz v. T. E. Connally, Inc., 45 Wash.
~d l 27, 273 P.2d 485, was not even a jury trial. In that
ras<' the court made detailed findings and the award was
--uhsequently adjusted because the trial court had not
takl'll i11to corn;icleration the present value of a future
loss. :\gain the question of waiver was not in issue.

In the instant case, it would seem that the same autlrnritiPs as cited under Points I and II A. of this brief
wonlcl 11ow bar defendant from raising this objection
on appeal.
CONCLUSION
D<>fendant "'as given a fair trial m this case and
has shown no valid reason why the court should award
a new trial or otherwise interfere with the verdict of the
jury. rrhe policy of the law is to bring litigation to an
encl and not to grant new trials merely because one of
the parties is unsatisfied with the retmlt.
shown under Point I of this brief, the defendant
was not deprived of his theory of the case. The instruct iolls, when considered as a whole, show that all of the
issues were fairly and intelligibly presented to the jury.
Further, the defendant did not request the trial court to
~\s
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instruct the jury on the specifir ground of negligencr of
which he now claims to he depriw•d. Ahw, and in any
event, the evidenee woulcl not su1)port a fim1iug of eontributory negligern·e on th0 ground alleged.
As shown under Point II of this brief, defornLrnt
is barred from claiming any error in the form of verdict where he failed to make timely objections thrreto.
There ·was no error in the form of \'erclict, and even if
there were error, it would he ha rm less and coulcl not pn"sibly be prejudicial.
Defendant has also waived his right to complain
about additional instructions which he rlaims slioulcl
have been given, but \Vhich he <lid not request.
Based upon all of the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests that the \'en1iet of the jury arn1 the judgment entered thereon he affirmed.
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